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4Introduction - Addressing Afghanistan
With a sustained drawdown of troops from Iraq Afghanistan has become the focus of the West’s military engagements in the region.  The initially well-supported response to the attacks of September 11th had lain neglected in the shadow 
of America’s ideological adventurism in the Middle East; and in the vacuum 
of political, military and economic commitment the overthrown Taliban 
have been resuscitated.  But is the West’s renewed interest in Afghanistan 
too little, too late?
The Iraq pause has at least engendered a rethinking of international at-
titudes towards Afghanistan, the primary result of which has been the 
recognition that ‘victory’ may mean compromise.  Afghanistan has been at war for least 30 years, 
and its disasters have arisen from other people’s conflicts.  From the perspective of the Afghan peo-
ple their country has been wrecked by forces that have had little to do with them, and it is for that 
reason that the only solution that is likely to endure for Afghanistan is one that comes from Afghan-
istan itself – enabled perhaps, by emphatically not imposed by outsiders.
The international community should therefore be thinking in terms of small compromises to forge 
a number of local settlements rather than attempting, by themselves, to resolve big issues on a 
national scale – the time for those will come.  Local compromises will need to be more than solely 
military ceasefires established with insurgent groups – they will also need to be settlements in terms 
of the economy, in terms of social values, and in terms of access to the resources of the state.
The development of such compromises will be difficult and lengthy given the complex and fragment-
ed nature of the Afghan situation compared to, say, Iraq.  Whilst the Taliban may be resurgent, they 
are but one of a plethora of groups and important local ‘strongmen’ that the Afghan government 
and its international partners need to begin a dialogue with, and that fact creates great complexity 
to the negotiations, but also the potential for negotiating a series of small compromises that will 
amount to a more satisfactory overall solution for the West than if it focused solely on discussions 
with Mullah Omar.  One could envision a situation where Afghanistan’s governance at the local level 
is undertaken by a whole series of groups, each backed by its own compromise agreement.  Finding 
the internal balance in Afghanistan that will allow this kind of imperfect and messy settlement to 
come about will not be easy, but it is now almost certainly the best solution for the country and for 
its relationship with the outside world.
The basic fact is that even with a military surge the chances of Afghanistan conducting a nationwide 
free and fair election anytime soon are remote.  Whilst the election campaigns that have been go-
ing on have contributed to drawing people into some kind of political process, but in the long run 
national elections may have many advantages, but they will not necessarily generate stability.  The 
West needs to think about Afghanistan’s society in terms of smaller units - ethnic groups; local areas; 
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5clans; even villages – rather than generating policy for a national level that is not really subscribed 
to, and that is too remote to solve those local issues.  
A policy rethink is already underway.  The United States has pledged to put more troops on the 
ground, something which will help, but only if more attempts are made to draw even the most vio-
lent groups into talks.  Indeed, without a political surge more troops could after some time actually 
be counterproductive, creating new targets rather than increased security.  There can be no purely 
military solution for a country that has got used to perpetual war, no matter how much manpower 
and hardware the United States and its international partners are prepared to put on the ground.
In this Strategic Update we look at Afghanistan in terms of the major issues around which local com-
promises will focus.  Jamie Shea discusses the difficulties of retaining the support of NATO govern-
ments and publics for the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan unless there is what he calls a ‘com-
prehensive approach’ among the international actors which has a renewed commitment to a realistic 
counter-insurgency strategy at its heart.
Antonio Giustozzi reflects on the growth of the neo-Taliban and associated insurgent groups.  He 
highlights that their disparate strategies and in particular the difficulties in establishing Mullah 
Omar’s goals makes the path of negotiations a profoundly uncertain one.  
Fabrice Pothier paints a picture of the sheer scale of the opium problem in Afghanistan and argues 
for a decoupling of the counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations as the first step towards 
creating the conditions under which the problem can be comprehensively addressed and negotiated 
settlements can proceed.  
Amalendu Misra explores the regional dimension to the Afghan problem, and suggests that the 
current variant of India and Pakistan’s deeply historical geostrategic competition for Afghanistan 
threatens both Afghanistan’s security and development.  At the same time, Iran could emerge as a 
relatively stable partner that might play a constructive role in compromise agreements.
Geography:
Area: 647,500 km2 (about the size of Texas)
Population: 32,738,376 
Population Density: 46/km2
Economy:
GDP (PPP):  $20.099 billion
per capita:  $733 
Labour Force:  15 Million        
by occupation:  agriculture: 80% 
  industry: 10% 
  services: 10%
Unemployment:  40% 
Budget:    revenues: $715 million 
  expenditures: $2.6 billion
Inflation rate:  13% (2007 est.)
Demographics:
Birth Rate:     45.82/1,000 population
Death Rate:  19.56/1,000 population
Pop’n growth: 2.626% 
Fertility Rate:  6.58 children born/woman
Infant Mortality: 155 deaths/1,000 live births
Life expectancy:  44.21 years
Society:
Religion:  Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia   
  Muslim 19%, other 1%
Literacy: male: 43.1%
  female: 12.6%
Ethnicity:  Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%,
  Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, 
  Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%,   
  Baloch 2%, other 4%
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